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Abstract— High-end MPSoC systems with built-in high-radix 
topologies achieve good performance because of the improved 
connectivity and the reduced network diameter. In high-end MPSoC 
systems, fault tolerance support is becoming a compulsory feature. In 
this work, we propose a combined method to address permanent and 
transient link and router failures in those systems. The LBDRhr 
mechanism is proposed to tolerate permanent link failures in some 
popular high-radix topologies. The increased router complexity may 
lead to more transient router errors than routers using simple XY 
routing algorithm. We exploit the inherent information redundancy 
(IIR) in LBDRhr logic to manage transient errors in the network 
routers. Thorough analyses are provided to discover the appropriate 
internal nodes and the forbidden signal patterns for transient error 
detection. Simulation results show that LBDRhr logic can tolerate all 
of the permanent failure combinations of long-range links and 80% 
of links failures at short-range links. Case studies show that the error 
detection method based on the new IIR extraction method reduces 
the power consumption and the residual error rate by 33% and up to 
two orders of magnitude, respectively, compared to triple modular 
redundancy. The impact of network topologies on the efficiency of 
the detection mechanism has been examined in this work, as well. 
Keywords-Networks-on-chip; transient error; permanent error; 
information redundancy; arbiter; reliability; fault tolerant 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Current multi-processor systems-on-chip (MPSoCs) are 
usually formed by tens of microprocessors and other 
components (such as memories) in the same chip. As 
technology advances, more and more components are included 
in MPSoCs; hundreds of components are expected to integrate 
into a single chip in the near future. One side effect of 
increasing component densities is the need of long 
interconnections, which creates a well-known communication 
bottleneck. Networks-on-Chip (NoCs) have demonstrated 
potential to manage this communication problem [1, 2].  
In MPSoCs, it is worth differentiating between application-
specific MPSoCs and high-end MPSoCs. In the former (e.g. 
Spidergon STNoC [3]), fully irregular topologies are derived as 
the system design is totally customized for the applications. In 
contrast, in high-end MPSoCs (e.g. Tilera [4]), regular 
structures (2D mesh-based topologies) are used. In this paper 
we focus on high-end MPSoCs. 
Reliability is one of the most critical emerging challenges, 
caused by ever increasing chip densities [5]. Nanoscale 
fabrication processes inevitably result in defective components, 
which lead to permanent errors. Without a proper solution, a 
simple failure may render the chip useless, impacting the yield 
and cost of manufacturing. One common approach to handle 
permanent errors in NoCs is to use fault-tolerant routing 
algorithms, which assume that the permanently unusable links 
and/or routers are isolated at the testing stage [6]. One recent 
solution that offers compact routing implementation and high 
fault tolerance is the Logic-Based Distributed Routing (LBDR) 
approach [7]. Transient errors are becoming equally important. 
As the critical charge of a capacitive node decreases with 
technology scaling, the probability that a high-energy particle 
strike flips the value in a storage node increases [8]. Moreover, 
transient error rates in logic gates are expected to increase 
because of higher frequencies and lower supply voltages [9]. 
Recently, inherent information redundancy (IIR) has been used 
to manage transient errors in a NoC based on XY routing [10].  
These two approaches combined (LBDR and IIR) can thus 
be envisioned as a good solution for addressing both permanent 
and transient errors in NoCs. However, as they were originally 
proposed, both were not extensively applied to the topologies 
and configurations for realistic applications. On one hand, the 
LBDR approach is designed for 2D meshes where routers are 
connected to one neighbor on each dimension and direction. 
On the other hand, because the uniqueness of XY routing used 
in [10], that approach is not suitable for the router designs with 
more advanced routing solutions. Indeed, recently, different 
topologies have been presented. 2-D meshes suffer from an 
increasing diameter and a limited bisection bandwidth as the 
system size increases. To address these issues, the new 
topologies add extra links connecting routers in the 2D mesh, 
thus providing additional connectivity and lower diameters. 
Three advanced topologies are shown in Fig. 1. The initial 2D 
mesh is the underlying topology.  
 
Fig. 1 Advanced solutions for 2D-meshes.  
 
Fig. 2 Block diagram of proposed router. 
In this work, we address fault tolerance for advanced 
topologies by redesigning the LBDR mechanism. The 
proposed LBDRhr (LBDR for high-radix networks) contains 
two virtual channels and includes an adaptive routing 
algorithm. We prove that LBDRhr is deadlock-free for any of 
the high-radix topologies even when certain links and/or 
routers permanently fail. We further couple the LBDRhr 
mechanism with a new error control method to detect the 
transient errors in LBDRhr logic. This new error control 
method exploits the inherent information redundancy in 
LBDRhr to significantly reduce the error control overhead. The 
overview of the proposed router is shown in Fig. 2.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The 
related work is discussed in Section II. In Section III we 
describe the new routing mechanism LBDRhr. The new 
method to extract inherent information redundancy in the 
LBDRhr approach is proposed in Section IV. Performance, 
area and power consumption are evaluated in Section V. 
Conclusions are provided in Section VI. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. Transient Error Detection for NoC Router 
Because of its temporary behavior, transient link errors can 
be managed with various error control coding methods—such 
as forward error correction (FEC), error detection combined 
with automatic repeat request (ARQ) retransmission, and 
hybrid ARQ (HARQ). ARQ and HARQ are not suitable for the 
route computation unit because no retransmission is allowed 
after the packet arrives in input FIFOs. Transient errors in NoC 
links can be managed using error control coding (ECC) [11-
13]. FEC methods are also used in the data path of NoC routers 
[14, 15]. Unfortunately, FEC techniques are only suitable for 
linear systems. In a NoC router, the control path (in charge of 
the routing of packets and the allocation of resources to 
packets) is not a linear system. Triple-modular redundancy 
(TMR) duplicating the unit under protection and selecting the 
output through majority voting is attractive for its simplicity 
and it has been applied to the router control path [16, 17]. 
Theoretically, TMR functions correctly when up to one-third of 
the received copies are wrong. Furthermore, the potential errors 
in the majority voter further reduce the effectiveness of the 
TMR approach, particularly when the number of units being 
protected is small [18]. In [10], the inherent information 
redundancy in the router using XY routing algorithm is 
investigated to reduce the packet loss and misrouting without 
significantly sacrificing power and area overhead. It has been 
shown that the residual error rate achieved by the inherent 
information redundancy based error control method is smaller 
than that of TMR.  
B. Permanent Error Management 
Permanent fault support in NoCs can be achieved by 
means of three main approaches: fault-tolerant routing 
algorithms, reconfiguration techniques and component 
redundancy. Routing algorithms for faulty NoCs have been 
extensively investigated to support irregular topologies 
derived from regular ones after permanent link failures. Some 
solutions [19, 20] are implemented using routing tables, 
suffering the scalability problems and routing costs derived 
from them. On the contrary, other solutions are logic-based. 
FDOR [21] is based on the idea of dividing an irregular mesh 
topology into regular sub-meshes. Although a large variety of 
irregular mesh topologies are supported, it does not offer full 
coverage. The uLBDR approach [7], however, is proposed as 
an efficient logic-based mechanism offering 100% coverage to 
faulty 2D-meshes. The routing information is condensed into a 
small set of bits distributed over the switches. Reconfiguration 
techniques are focused on adequately updating the routing 
tables whenever failures occur. ARIADNE [22] is a 
distributed reconfiguration solution for agnostic NoCs capable 
of circumventing large numbers of simultaneous faults. 
Compared with other solutions [23, 24], it guarantees higher 
performance during normal operation since no virtual channels 
are restricted to deterministic routing. Component redundancy 
is the easiest way for providing fault tolerance, but needs to 
consider the extra cost derived from redundant components. 
To the best of our knowledge, there are no solutions that 
are able to allow distributed routing implementation in faulty 
high-radix topologies with no routing tables and minimum 
logic. The LBDRhr approach we proposed in this work 
replaces the routing tables with a small and bounded set of bits 
that are finally hardwired, offering support for a great number 
of irregular shapes derived from high-radix topologies. We 
also exploit the inherent information redundancy in LBDRhr 
logic to manage transient errors in high-end MPSoC systems. 
III. LBDRHR MECHANISM FOR HIGH-RADIX TOPOLOGIES 
A. LBDRhr Description 
In this section we describe the LBDRhr mechanism, an 
extension of LBDRx [25], which is able to tolerate permanent 
link and router failures. We assume that links are bidirectional 
in this work. As shown in Fig. 3, this method is implemented 
with three basic logic blocks, each addressing different port 
types: 3-hop, 2-hop and 1-hop ports. 3-hop ports are those 
connected to long-range links that connect two routers with a 
distance of 3-hops (through the basic 2D-mesh). 2-hop ports 
are connected to links that connect to routers at 2-hop 
distance. 1-hop ports are connected to 2D-mesh links.  
LBDRhr uses a few configuration bits to store local 
information about the neighboring links: 8 configuration bits 
for routing purposes (Rne, Rnw, Ren, Res, Rwn, Rws, Rse, 
and Rsw); 2 bits (DR1 and DR0) for two deroute options 
(special cases) at every input port; and one connectivity bit per 
output port (Cx for port X), which can be hardwired. With this 
compact information per router, LBDRhr addresses fault 
tolerance without using routing tables, achieving important 
savings in critical aspects such as area, latency and power.  
Fig. 3 Diagram of LBDRhr 
First of all, the logic computes the relative position of the 
message’s destination. Note that packets forwarded to the 
local port are excluded from the routing logic. With this logic, 
the directions to take for the packet are computed. Signals 
NNN’, SSS’, EEE’ and WWW’ indicate whether the 
destination is at least 3 hops in the give direction. Similarly, 
the signals of 2 hops and 1 hop are computed. 
In the first logic block, if the packet’s destination is at least 
three hops along the same direction away from the current 
router, then the corresponding 3-hop port is selected. A simple 
AND gate per 3-hop output port is needed to AND both the 
proper comparator signal and the connectivity bits (the 
presence) of the 3-hop port (e.g., NNN’ signal and the Cnnn 
bit). Notice that the logic may select more than one output port 
as a candidate for routing. For example, in a NoC with the 
flattened butterfly topology, a packet at router 0 (located in the 
upper left corner) with destination at router 15 (located in the 
lower right corner) can use both EEE and SSS output ports. 
The second logic block deals with 2-hop ports. In this case, 
3-hop ports have priority over 2-hop ports. Therefore, the 3-
hop signal is considered in this block (the 3-hop signal is 
easily computed by ORing all the output signals from the 3-
hop logic block). The 2-hop block behaves similarly to the 
previous one: 2-hop ports are selected if the destination is at 
least two hops away along the intended direction. Directions 
that are covered in this block are NN, EE, WW, and SS, for 
the mesh with express channels, and NE, ES, WS, and WN, 
for the diagonal mesh topology. A simple 4-entry AND gate is 
required for every output port (ANDing the 3-hop signal, the 
availability of the output port, and the combined outputs of the 
comparators). Notice that 3-hop ports and 2-hop ports will 
never be selected at the same time for the same packet. 
Finally, the third logic block deals with 1-hop ports. In this 
case, complexity is higher. The logic is replicated in two 
blocks. The first block (1-hop-adap) is filtered by the 3-hop 
and 2-hop signals. Thus, selecting 3-hop or 2-hop ports 
prevents using 1-hop ports. The second block (1-hop-escape), 
however, is not filtered out by the previous blocks and works 
independently. The 1-hop-adap and 1-hop-escape blocks 
consider both routing and deroute bits in the same manner 
they are configured and used in [7]. Notice that these bits are 
only used in the underlying 2D-mesh to provide non-minimal 
path support. In particular, the logic forces messages to take a 
non-minimal port whenever the second part of the logic fails 
in routing the message. 
B. Deadlock-free Routing 
With the provided logic and with no further support, 
deadlocks can easily form. In order to avoid deadlocks, and 
still keeping the LBDRhr approach simple, we combine the 
mechanism with a routing algorithm using two virtual 
channels. The first virtual channel (VC0) is used to route 
packets freely using minimal paths through long-range links 
(3-hop and 2-hop ports). Also, packets can be routed through 
1-hop links but taking into account both routing bits and 
deroute bits. The second virtual channel, however, can be used 
only for routing packets through 1-hop links and by taking 
into account routing and deroute bits. Therefore, the 
underlying 2D-mesh topology must provide a deadlock-free 
routing implementation. 
The arbiter needs also to be codesigned with LBDRhr. 
Notice that for some packets different routing options may be 
available at the same time: some output ports through VC0 
and some outputs through VC1. To avoid deadlocks, the 
arbiter must filter out those routing options that could allow 
packets moving from VC1 to VC0 again. That is, once a 
packet moves to VC1 it will stay in VC1 along its route until it 
reaches its destination. Therefore, VC1 implements an escape 
path through the underlying 2D-mesh topology. When the 
packet is at VC0, adaptive and escape options are available 
because of the LBDRhr logic. The arbiter should give higher 
priority to adaptive output ports. In the case the adaptive 
output port is busy, the escape output port must be selected. 
Finally, packets will be injected always through VC0 (to 
maximize the flexibility).  
In order to clarify how the arbiter and the virtual channels 
are used, an example is shown in Fig. 4. The right part of the 
figure represents VC1 (the escape layer) through a 2D-mesh 
topology with some faulty links. On the other hand, the left 
part represents VC0 (escape and adaptive layers) through the 
previous faulty 2D-mesh topology along with express 
channels, where there also exist faulty express channels. 
 
Fig. 4 An example of routing using virtual channels. 
As an example we route a packet from router 0 to router 15. 
At a first sight, we observe that there exist several options in 
both layers for reaching our destination. 
On VC1, four escape paths are possible. From router 0 to 
router 2 there is only one valid option, but at router 2 two 
options are possible (through router 6 and through routers 3, 7 
and 6). At router 10, there are two new options again (through 
router 11 and through router 14). By combining these options, 
up to four paths are possible. It is important to note that, when 
router 7 is reached (through router 3), there is no minimal path 
available for reaching router 15 because there is a faulty link 
between routers 7 and 11. Therefore, at Router 7, a deroute 
option is needed (in this case going West to router 6). At 
router 6, it is possible to reach the destination without using 
deroutes (through a minimal path) with the options previously 
commented. Note that the sub-path using the deroute option is 
marked with dashed line. Note also that routing in VC1 is 
deadlock-free based on LBDR.  
On VC0, the previous four escape paths and new four 
adaptive paths are available. Concerning the adaptive paths, 
the first two options share the path until router 10, but in this 
case using 2-hop links (express channels). Options 3 and 4 
share the path until router 8 using a 2-hop link. Therefore, in 
this example the arbiter will select between the eight options 
available through VC0. Remember that options with longer 
links have priority over shorter ones, so at the end, the arbiter 
will choose between the four adaptive paths available. Note 
that a change between VC0 and VC1 directly depends on the 
dynamic conditions of the network (explained previously) that 
does not affect the conclusions drew from our example. 
IV. PROPOSED IIR-BASED TRANSIENT ERROR  DETECTION 
METHOD FOR LBDRHR LOGIC  
A. Inherent Information Redundancy (IIR) Extraction 
In this work, the forbidden signal patterns in routers are 
regarded as inherent information redundancy. LBDRhr logic 
determines the next-hop on the path for the packet at the 
current node. If one or more logic gates in the LBDRhr logic 
fail because of transient errors, the packet may be routed to 
wrong directions, thus causing either additional latency or 
deadlocks. For a router using XY routing, the route path 
determination unit is simple: only one output request is valid 
per each packet. As a result, detecting the number of valid 
output requests can identify transient errors in the CMP unit. 
TABLE 1. Five request failures 
 
Sigma-and-branch error detection [10] has been successfully 
applied to routers using the XY routing algorithm. 
To facilitate fault-tolerant routing, LBDRhr logic may 
generate multiple valid requests to use the output ports. 
Consequently, the method in [10] is not feasible. However, the 
principle of inherent information redundancy extraction is 
applicable to the LBDRhr-based routers. Different with [10], 
we classify the forbidden signal patterns existing in the output 
port requests into four general categories: 
• Mute-Request: None of the output ports is requested when 
a packet header flit arrives at the input port. As shown in 
Table 1-case (e), the valid request (high logic value) is 
muted by logic gate failures. 
• Multiple-Request:  One or more non-valid requests are 
flipped to be ‘valid’ requests, resulting in accessing two 
opposite directions, as shown in Table 1-cases (b) and (c). 
Those are illegal signal combinations, which can be used 
to detect the malfunction of the LBDRhr logic.  
• Switched-Single-Request: A non-header flit arrives but 
there is a request to build a input port-output port 
connection. Or, the destination and the current nodes have 
the same horizontal or vertical coordinate, nevertheless 
the next-hop route deviates from horizontal or vertical 
direction. As shown in Table 1-case (a), the transient error 
in LBDRhr logic causes an non-reasonable request to 
access the output port.  
• Bidirectional-Switched-Request: The request to the 
intended output port is muted while another opposite 
output port is requested, as shown in Table 1-case(d).  
The summary of Table 1 is based on the routing 
phenomena that two opposite directions cannot be enabled at 
the same time. Without losing generality, we use the pair of 
east and west ports to introduce the error detection approach 
based on the different error scenarios shown in Table 1. 
B. IIR-Based Error Detection for LBDRhr Logic 
We propose to detect transient errors in each function unit. 
As shown in Fig. 5, a CMP error detection unit is used to 
detect the forbidden signal patterns in the coordinator 
comparison unit; the multi-hop logic (MHL) error detection 
unit is used to examine the transient errors in the 24 output 
port request; the deroute error detection unit is used to identify 
the wrong deroute path. Any of the detected errors invokes to 
re-compute the direction for the next hop. The details for these 
three error detection units are discussed in the following 
subsections.  
 
Fig. 5 Overview of proposed error detection method for LBDRhr logic. 
    
(a)                                (b) 
Fig. 6 Coordinate comparison unit (a) without error detection and (b) with the 
proposed error detection.  
1) Error Detection for CMP Unit 
The coordinate comparison module (CMP) is implemented 
with a subtraction unit and six threshold comparison units (>2, 
<-2, >1, <-1, >0 and <0), as shown in Fig. 6(a). Xcurr and 
Xdest are the x coordinates for the current and destination 
nodes, respectively. This CMP provides the prime signals for 
3-hops, 2-hops and 1-hop units in the LBDRhr logic (shown in 
Fig. 3). Similar to the CMP for XY routing, the opposite 
directions cannot be enabled at the same time. As a result, 
multiple-request error detection is still applicable in LBDRhr. 
We use the expressions (1)-(3) to detect multiple-requests. 
Err1.1 = WWW’ & EEE’              (1) 
Err1.2 = WW’ & EE’               (2) 
Err1.3= W’ & E’               (3) 
The second inherent information redundancy in the three-
stage LBDRhr logic is the information downward 
compatibility. If the subtraction output of Xcurr and Xdest is 
greater than 2 (i.e. WWW’=1), WW’ and W’ should be true, as 
well; otherwise, it indicates that the threshold comparison 
units have errors. Meanwhile, we keep the forbidden signal 
patterns of the opposite directions in mind to further constrain 
the signal patterns among E’, W’, EE’, WW’, EEE’ and 
WWW’, as expressed in (4)-(7): 
Err2.1= WWW’ & !(WW’ & W’ & EE’_n & E’_n)             (4) 
Err2.2 = EEE’ & !(EE’& E’ & WW’_n & W’_n)               (5) 
Err 2.3= WW’ & !(W’ & E’_n)           (6) 
Err2.4= EE’ & ! (E’ & W’_n)           (7) 
in which, EE’_n, E’_n, WW’_n and W’_n are the inverted 
values of EE’, E’, WW’ and W’, respectively. With 
expressions (1)-(7), we can successfully identify the multiple 
requests, rather than the switched single-request, bidirectional 
switched-request and mute-request.  
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Fig. 7 Error detection rate breakdown for each signal combination in CMP 
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Fig. 8 Error detection rate of the proposed CMP. 
Fortunately, we discovered the third type inherent 
information redundancy to detect the rest of request failure: 
the information consistency between the internal node A (in 
Fig. 6) and the CMP outputs. If the subtraction is not zero, E’ 
and W’ cannot both be zero because the value of A is either 
larger than zero or less than zero. When the subtraction is 
zero, neither E’ nor W’ can be zero because of the nature of 
‘>2’, ‘<-2’, ‘>1’, ‘<-1’, ‘>0’ and ‘<0’ comparison units.  
Err3 = (A_n & (E’ | W’))  |  (A & E’_n & W’_n)           (8) 
The three IIR-based error detection outputs are ORed to 
obtain the overall error detection decision, ErrCMP, as shown in 
Fig. 6(b). We verify the error detection coverage of the error 
detection logic by flipping logic values of some gates in CMP 
unit. The error detection rate is the ratio of the number of error-
detectable cases over the number of the total error injection 
cases. As shown in Fig. 7, no matter how the NoC size 
changes, the error detection rate for E’ and W’ is 100% because 
of the use of the internal node. Since the zero/non-zero 
subtraction output does not contribute to detect the errors 
causing wrong EE’, WW’, EEE’ and WWW’, only the 
occurrence of opposite direction pairs helps to detect errors in 
EE’, WW’, EEE’ and WWW’. Therefore, the error detection 
rate for EE’, WW’, EEE’ and WWW’ is less than 1. A larger 
NoC size is more likely to obtain a nonzero subtraction output 
(i.e. A!=0). As a result, the proposed method achieves a higher 
error detection rate in smaller NoCs, as shown in Fig. 7.  
We exhaustively examined the impact of the number of 
failure gates on the CMP error detection rate. As shown in 
Fig. 8, the proposed method can successfully captures most of 
the single errors. As the number of failure gates increases, 
more errors occur on EE’-WW’ and EEE’-WWW’; 
consequently, the error detection rate slightly decreases. 
 
                               (a)                                                     (b) 
Fig. 9 Possible directions in LBDRhr (a) 1- and 2-hop (b) 3-hop directions 
 
Fig. 10 Pairs of the forbidden concurrent routing directions. The center point 
is where the packet is currently located. Dash line and dot line are overlapped 
with solid line on the N/S/W/E directions. 
2) Error Detection for Hop Logic  
The LBDRhr is designed to facilitate the multi-hop 
routing, as shown in Fig. 9. In the XY routing, we found only 
two pairs of opposite directions; however, in the LBDRhr 
routing logic, we found ten pairs of opposite directions, each 
one on the 180-degree line shown in Fig. 10. Although 
adaptive routing algorithms can provide multiple routing 
paths, two directions opposite to each other are not likely 
offered at the same time. Consequently, we obtain three new 
inherent information redundancies in the multi-hop logic 
(MHL): 
The opposite direction pairs (1)-(8) are eight strong 
opposite cases. For example, in the pair of NNE-SSW, N is 
opposite to S and E is opposite to W, therefore these two 
constraints further ensure the impossible occurrence of NNE=1 
and SSW=1.  
i. As shown in Fig. 3, NN’, SS’, WW’ and EE’ are generated 
with the use of the 3-hop signals. As a result, pair (1) 
should inherently match to pair (9); similarly, pair (5) 
should inherently match to pair (10) in Fig. 10.  
ii. Other than the 180 degree line, the symmetric directions 
belonging to different quadrants are also exclusive, 
because part of the logic is exclusive. For example, NNE 
and SSE cannot be true as the same time. To enable NNE, 
the 2-hop north direction (i.e. NN’) has to be true, which 
means 2-hop south direction (i.e. SS’) is not enabled. As a 
result, NNE and SSE cannot be selected in the same router 
port. Consequently, we have more forbidden signal 
patterns to detect errors.  
The inherent information redundancy (i) inspires us to use 
the expression (9) to detect errors in the 3-hops logic. 
Err3-hops = (NNE & SSW) | (EEN & SSW) | (EES & WWN) | (SSE & 
NNW) | (NNN & SSS) | (EEE & WWW) | (NNE & NNW) | (SSW & 
SSE) | (EEN & EES) | (EES & EEW) | (WWN & WWS)           (9) 
However, this logic can only detect the errors for the 
multiple request scenarios. As shown in Fig. 3, the connection 
vector Cdest also plays an important role to determine the 
possible route for the packet’s next hop. Given a network 
topology, we can eliminate some 3-hops paths. With this prior 
knowledge, we further detect the errors in the 3-hops logic. 
For the 4x4 diagonal and mesh with express lanes topologies, 
all outputs of the 3-hops logic are zero. This simplifies the 
error detection and improves the error detection rate.  
The inherent information redundancy (ii) and (iii) inspire 
us to use the expression (10) to detect errors in the 2-hops unit. 
Again, we also use the prior-knowledge of Cdest to detect 
switched-request and mute-request.  
Err2-hops = (NN & SS)  |  (EE & WW)  |  (NE & SW)  |  (SE 
& NW) |  (NE & SE) |  (SW & SE)         (10) 
Whenever any of the previous error detection is true, it will 
invoke to re-compute the output port request. Fig. 11 shows 
the error detection rate of the proposed method is above 0.8, 
which maintains as the number of injected error increases. We 
also examine the impact of different topologies on the error 
detection rate. As shown in Fig. 11, the proposed method has 
minor variation on the error detection rate. This is because an 
all-zero Cdest vector simplifies the error detection circuit and 
thus reduces the probability of detection circuit failure.  The 
error detection efficiency for the 2-hops is slightly less than 
that for 3-hops logic. The interesting phenomena we observed 
was that the proposed method improves the error detection 
rate of 2-hops logic as the number of error injected to the logic 
increases. A similar approach is applied to detect the error in 
1-hop logic. Because of the sufficient IIR, we achieve the 
error detection rate of 1 in the 1-hop logic unit.  
3) Error Detection for Deroute Logic  
The deroute logic provides a non-minimal path in case the 
minimal path is not available, because of permanent errors. 
Based on the DR vector, the alternative paths are constructed 
with regular logic. For example, the Nderoute, Sderoute, Ederoute and 
Wderoute are expressed in (11)-(14). 
Nderoute= ~DR[0] &~DR[1]          (11) 
Ederoute= ~DR[0]& DR[1]           (12) 
Wderoute =DR[0]&~DR[1]            (13) 
Sderoute =DR[0]&DR[1]                (14) 
The fact that the four directions are exclusive is regarded 
as a new inherent information redundancy to detect errors in 
the deroute logic. The simulation performed also considers the 
impact of failures in the error detection circuit. As shown in 
Fig. 13, the proposed error detection method can even tolerate 
the errors in the error detection circuit, as long as the number of 
errors injected is no more than four. Fig. 13 also shows that the 
decrease of the error detection rate is negligible. 
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Fig. 14 Residual error rate comparison.          Fig. 15 Impact of gate error rate on LBDRhr reliability.       Fig. 16 Impact of network topologies on reliability. 
 
V.  EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
A. Experimental Setup 
We evaluated the performance and overhead of the routers 
without protection, using TMR, and using proposed methods. 
The experiments were performed on topologies derived from a 
4x4 mesh topology, TMR was applied on the entire LBDRhr 
logic; each output port uses a majority voter to guess the most 
likely output. The residual error rate is simulated on the gate-
level description of the LBDRhr logic. Each data point was 
obtained from few million random simulations. Area, power 
and delay are obtained based on the synthesized netlist from 
Synopsys Design Compiler using a TSMC 65nm typical 
technology and 1 GHz clock frequency.  
B. Reliability 
In this experiment, we randomly flipped the logic gate 
value to simulate the transient error in LBDRhr logic. The 
residual error rate is the ratio of the number of cases that the 
error detection method cannot identify the error over the total 
number of the error injection cases. We vary the number of the 
error injected in this experiment. As shown in Fig. 14, the 
residual error rate of the proposed method for 1-bit error is 
higher than that of TMR. This is because TMR can 
successfully tolerate 1-bit error, unless the error happens to the 
majority voter. In contrast, the proposed method has limited 
capability to detect the switched single-request and mute-
request. However, the error detection circuit is not error free; if 
the number of injected errors increases, our method reduces the 
residual error rate by up to 90%. If the ratio of failed gates over 
the total logic unit is fixed, our approach is better than TMR. 
Because TMR has three times the logic gates as the original 
design, more logic gates potentially encounter more gate 
failures. As shown in Fig. 15, our method reduces the residual 
error rate by two orders of magnitude over TMR. 
In Fig. 16, we show the impact of network topologies on 
the error detection rate. TMR has negligible impact by the 
network topologies; our approach slightly varies the error 
detection rate because we use the Cdest vector as redundancy 
information to detect errors. The proposed method also 
achieves a 30% higher error detection rate than the TMR.  
C. Flit Throughput and Latency 
For the next experiments we studied the behavior of the 3 
proposed topologies using the gNoCsim simulator (an in-
house cycle accurate simulator). We first performed the 
experiments without considering link failures, and then 
incrementally add faulty links to each topology up to obtain 
the underlying 2D-mesh. Fig. 17 compares the traffic 
generated with the maximum mean value of traffic actually 
received. In all of the cases, the flit throughput decreases with 
the number of failures up to 0.33 flit/cycle/nic. We also 
compared the traffic generated with the average network flit 
latency at the first traffic point (low network load). As shown 
in Fig. 18, a larger number of link failures leads to a higher 
latency. Finally, we redid the experiments and additionally 
considered a faulty underlying 2D-mesh. Similar results were 
obtained. After examining all the failure combinations of long-
range links for the 3 proposed topologies, we found that the 
LBDRhr logic successfully facilitates all nodes to reach any 
other nodes in the network; the topologies with a higher radix 
offer better performance for a given number of failures. In 
addition, as demonstrated in [7], 80% of the failure patterns of 
the underlying 2D-mesh were covered by the LBDR approach.  
D. Area 
The TMR approach need three copies of the core elements 
in LBDRhr, so consumes more than two times the area 
compared to the LBDRhr logic without error detection. Our 
method exploits the inherent information redundancy and does 
not dramatically induce overhead, only causing a 6.1% area 
overhead, as shown in Table 2.  
 
Fig. 17 Flit throughput. 
 
Fig. 18 Flit latency. 
TABLE 2 Area, Power and Delay 
 LBDRhr without 
Error Detection 
LBDRhr with 
Proposed Error 
Detection 
LBDRhr with 
TMR 
Area (μm2) 342 (100%) 363 (106.1%) 806 (235.7%)) 
Delay (ns) 0.495 (100%) 0.54 (109.1%) 0.51 (103%) 
Power Dyn.(μW) 199.97 (100%) 207.27 (103.7%) 267.39 (133.7%) 
Leak(μW) 1.8084 (100%) 1.8405 (101.8%) 4.0969 (226.5%) 
E. Power and Delay 
As shown in Table 2, the proposed error detection method 
exploits the inherent information redundancy to reduce the 
hardware overhead. In the new LBDRhr logic, we find the 
appropriate internal nodes and discover the exclusive signal 
pairs, as well as other logical forbidden signal patterns. Error 
detection based on the inherent information above only causes 
the dynamic power and leakage power increase by 3.7% and 
1.8%, respectively. Compared to TMR, our method reduces 
the power by 30%. The error detection circuit detects the 
conflicts between signals, resulting in the increase on the 
critical path. Although increased by 9.1%, the total worst-case 
delay 0.54 ns is still below the desired clock period of 1ns. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
We proposed a combined method to address both 
permanent and transient failures in high-end MPSoC systems. 
For the former, the LBDRhr mechanism is proposed. For the 
latter, we exploit the inherent information redundancy (IIR) in 
LBDRhr logic. The high complexity of the LBDRhr logic 
limits the application of the previous IIR detection approach for 
XY routing. Compared to the previous work, we discover more 
inherent information redundancy extraction rules to detect the 
transient errors in the LBDRhr. This is complement to the 
methods that use forward error correction for transient errors 
on the link. Analysis and simulation results show that the 
proposed method is able to cover permanent failures of all the 
long-range links and 80% of the failure combinations of the 
2D-mesh links. For transient errors, our method reduces the 
residual error rate and the average power consumption by up to 
200x and 30%, respectively, over triple modular redundancy. 
In the future work, we will extend our solution to manage the 
errors in the arbiter and crossbar logic. 
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